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A CASE OF LIBERTY DENIED
Gary . €lliott*
On many university and college campuses, there exists an anti-
civil-libertarian spirit reminiscent of the McCarthy period. During the
1940s and early 1950s, regents, trustees, academic administrations,
and the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), al-
though each for a different reason, persuaded the Academy to repress
personal liberty. It is difficult to pinpoint precisely when constitution-
ally and statutorily protected liberties and rights became secondary to
insulating educational institutions from damage suits in their pursuit
of a selective social and political agenda.
In the late 1980s many public educational institutions adopted
hate speech codes. For example, the University of Michigan adopted a
code proscribing certain kinds of speech, which was later challenged as
an infringement on First Amendment freedoms.' The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ruled the speech
code unconstitutional.2 Two years later, the United States District
Court in Eastern Wisconsin struck down a similar code at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin as a violation of speech protected by the First
Amendment.3 While principled scholars argued against the govern-
ment restraint of speech and prevailed at several institutions, it took
Dr. Gary E. Elliott is a Professor of History at the Community College of Southern
Nevada where he teaches Constitutional History and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.
Professor Elliott is the author of several books and over a dozen scholarly articles.
1. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
2. See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 853.
3. See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp.
1163, 1164 (E.D. Wisc. 1991). The AAUP opposition to proscriptions on speech is
effectively presented by Forum: Discouraging Hate Speech Without Codes, ACADEME,
Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 18; Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Truth or Consequences: Putting Limits
on Limits, ACADEME, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 14; Paul McMasters, Free Speech Versus Civil
Discourse: Where Do We Go From Here, ACADEME, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 8. The position
taken throughout this Essay is that the AAUP has been selective in its advocacy and
support for protected freedoms. Its stand on protected speech and privacy interests
highlights this inconsistency. For a spirited defense of hate speech codes within the
context of affirmative action, see CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE
WON'T Go BACK MAMNG THE CASE FORAFPXRmATrWE ACTON 218-20 (1997).
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court action to reaffirm the principle of freedom of speech at many
colleges and universities.4
Not long after the hate speech debacles, sexual harassment pro-
scriptions were adopted at many institutions of higher learning. In
many cases these policies were hastily drafted, resulting in imprecise
language, vague terms with conflicting interpretations, and confusion
over exactly what was being proscribed: gender discrimination or sex-
ual language and activity. Much of the language used in the policy
statements was taken from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) Guidelines to assist employers' implementation
*of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC Guidelines
were designed for workplace situations and are not applicable to fac-
ulty-student relationships. Whether public or private, universities and
colleges are not businesses, do not provide a consumable commodity,
and do not fall under the same rules. The lack of precision in the
adopted language has given license to academic administrators, unen-
cumbered by standards of academic freedom and personal privacy
rights, to fashion highly subjective sexual harassment policies. As a
result, university and college administrators have forced many profes-
sors to defend their behavior before disciplinary committees and even
in federal court.
Conceivably the poor draftsmanship of these sexual harassment
policies caused unanticipated consequences such as damaged reputa-
tions and financial loss. However, more recent consensual relationship
policies (CRPs), proscribing lawful consensual relations between fac-
ulty and students, present an even greater harm. CRPs and their
advocates threaten to emasculate the guarantees of personal liberty
embodied in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution, adopting a standard for government action
4. See, e.g., Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996); Silva
v. University of N. H., 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994).
5. For professors forced to seek redress in federal court in support of academic freedom
and free speech, see Cohen, 92 F.3d 968; Silva, 888 F. Supp. 293. Both the Silva and
Cohen cases concerned alleged gender discrimination due to a hostile learning envi-
ronment. Seventy years earlier, the Supreme Court decided Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923), addressing the-state-enacted statute prohibiting the teaching of
German. The Court found the statute violated the liberty interests of teacher and pu-
pil and held that this privilege of teaching and acquiring useful knowledge is
"essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
See NATIONAL AssOCATION OF SCHOLARS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ACADEMIC
FREEDOM (Feb. 1994), for a general catalog of injustices inflicted on faculty mem-
bers.
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disfavored by the Supreme Court. This Essay will focus on the threats
posed by the CRP to the academy and constitutionally protected
rights.
I. GENDER DISCRIMINATION AND LAWFUL CONSENSUAL SEXUAL
RELATIONSHIPS: CONFUSION ELEVATED TO PRINCIPLE
At its annual meeting in 1995, the AAUP adopted a sexual har-
assment policy.6  One policy directive entitled, "Bringing a
Complaint," states, "[d]issemination of information relating to the
case should be limited, in order that the privacy of all individuals in-
volved is safeguarded as fully as possible." 7 This concern for the
privacy interests of a complainant and a respondent are misplaced in
the context of an allegation of gender discrimination, because there is
no statutory provision that protects the complainant or the perpetra-
tor in connection with Tide VII or IX violations, and there is no
constitutionally recognized privacy interest to be protected. The
AAUP is taking a contradictory stand on privacy interests; while tak-
ing steps to protect the privacy of persons involved in sexual
harassment claims, it invades the privacy of others by regulating adult
consensual relationships.
The AAUP linked two very dissimilar relationships when issuing
the policy statement on consensual relations and simultaneously en-
dorsing the sexual harassment statement. In fact, both policy
statements were presented to AAUP members in the same document,
thereby creating the false impression that the two subjects are similar
and of equal import. The AAUP position on consensual relationships
states:
Sexual relations between students and faculty members
with whom they also have an academic or evaluative rela-
tionship are fraught with the potential for exploitation. The
respect and trust accorded a professor by a student, as well as
the power exercised by the professor in an academic or
evaluative role, make voluntary consent by the student sus-
pect. Even when both parties initially have consented, the
6. See Sexual Harassment:. Suggested Policy and Procedures for Handling Complaints, ACA-
DEME, July-Aug. 1995, at 62-64 [hereinafter Suggested Policy].
7. Suggested Policy, supra note 6, at 63.
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development of a sexual relationship renders both the faculty
member and the institution vulnerable to possible later alle-
gations of sexual harassment in light of the significant power
differential that exists between faculty members and stu-
dents.
In their relationships with students, members of the fac-
ulty are expected to be aware of their professional
responsibilities and avoid apparent or actual conflict of in-
terest, favoritism, or bias. When a sexual relationship exists,
effective steps should be taken to ensure unbiased evaluation
or supervision of the student.8
Unlike the statement on sexual harassment,9 the CRP lacks references
to statutory prohibitions on consensual relationships because, with
only a few exceptions,'0 the government has not intruded into private
consensual matters as proposed by the CRP.
There is little evidence indicating that lawful consensual sexual
relations" are widespread or pose any significant problem for the
academy.. In fact, it is not clear to me what evidence the AAUP con-
sidered in issuing its CRP statement. 2 It appears that the AAUP relied
on an article by Peter DeChiara.' 3 In the article, DeChiara defines
consensual relationships between a teacher and student as those which
arise "free from any intentional threat by the teacher." 4 Notwith-
standing this lack of threatening behavior and the fact that the
frequency of such unions is difficult to estimate, he posits that such
8. Consensual Relations Between Faculty and Students, ACADEME, July-Aug. 1995, at 64
[hereinafter Consensual Relations].
9. See Suggested Policy, supra note 6, at 62-63.
10. See infra part IV.
11. I use the term "consensual relationship" refer to a lawful association between con-
senting adults.
12. See Letter from Ann H. Franke, Associate Secretary and Counsel, American Associa-
tion of University Professors, to Gary E. Elliott (Apr. 15, 1997) (on file with the
author). Included with the letter were four artides from the AAUP file on consensual
relationships. There was no indication that only the enclosed material was consid-
ered, however, this Essay is based on the information provided to the author by the
AAUP.
13. See Peter DeChiara, The Need For Universities to Have Rules on Consensual Sexual
Relationships Between Faculty Members and Students, 21 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.,
137 (1988).
14. DeChiara, supra note 13, at 138.
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relationships should be banned because they could result in harm or
favoritism.15
Consensual sexual relationships are not unlawful. Furthermore,
those involved do not violate any specific duty owed to the public,
and no harm is done to any individual. Still, DeChiara and the
AAUP, who are both unharmed third parties, have claimed for the
government or the academic institution, other unharmed third parties,
the right to step in and require conditions in which neither they nor
society have any direct interest. Certainly, the government has a pri-
mary and legitimate role in preventing harm to members of society;
however, this governmental power is susceptible to abuse, thereby
threatening the individual liberty of the people.
Concern about favoritism arising from consensual sexual relation-
ships between faculty and students is one reason for DeChiara's
proposed ban on such unions. 6 The AAUP expanded this rationale to
include "apparent or actual conflict of interest, favoritism, or bias."
7
This is an extension of the Association's Statement on Professional
Ethics, mentioned in the sexual harassment policy, which refers to
"the ethical responsibility of faculty members to avoid 'any exploita-
tion of students for ... private advantage.' This concern with
professional ethics and favoritism is merely a pretext for an inappro-
priate and misplaced activist political and social agenda.
The heightened sensitivity to "apparent or actual conflict of in-
terest, favoritism, or bias" is selectively applied to sexual relationships
and is not uniformly applied across the academy. It is mere specula-
tion to conclude that consensual sexual relations between a faculty
member and a student would inevitably result in favoritism. While the
prospect of favorable treatment is increased if the student is enrolled
in one of the professor's courses, there is no reason to conclude that
favoritism will necessarily flow from the relationship. The student
might well have no need, or interest, in gaining favor with the profes-
sor. The fear of favoritism is even less viable if the student is not
attending the professor's classes, majoring in the same discipline, or
attending classes on the same campus.
The AAUP's concern with "apparent favoritism" is particularly
problematic because it is selectively applied. Professor Peter J. Markie
15. See DeChiara, supra note 13, at 138-139, 144-45.
16, See DeChiara, supra note 13, at 144-45.
17. ConsensualRelations, supra note 8, at 64 (emphasis added).
18. Suggested Policy, supra note 6, at 62.
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argues that professors should not fraternize with students because to
do so would compromise the moral obligations of professors. 9 On
one hand, this is a moral and compelling argument. However, the
Markie thesis has been misapplied-proscribing consensual sexual
behavior rather than any relationships that have the potential for, or
appearance of, favoritism. For example, the AAUP has not suggested
banning faculty participation in student clubs. Likewise, no one has
suggested restricting minority or women faculty from actively advising
minority or women campus organizations.
Remarks by Professor Randall Kennedy illustrate the potential
bias inherent in even nonsexual faculty-student relationships. Profes-
sor Kennedy, discussing the actions of Professor Stephen Carter, who
regularly invites African-American law students to his home for re-
freshments and discussion, expressed concern about the favoritism and
bias that arises from such closeness to a select group of students and
the extraordinary difficulty of separating the personal and professional
sphere. Kennedy admits that "[t]he students invited to the professor's
home are surely being afforded an opportunity denied those who are
not invited-an opportunity likely to be reflected in, for instance,
letters of recommendation." 20 What is unsettling is not Professor Ken-
nedy's "apparent favoritism," but the realization that the AAUP would
not be at all concerned with this form of favoritism, while consensual
sexual relations inspire a heightened interest.
Favoritism and "apparent favoritism" run deep throughout the
academy. However, hiring goals, personal connections, pressure
placed on faculty selection committees by academic administrators to
hire more minority faculty, politicization of the curriculum under the
guise of "cultural diversity," selection of spouses and family members
for positions within the same university system, entrance preferences
to sons and daughters of alumni, athletic scholarships given to those
who would not otherwise qualify, have all failed to inspire the high-
sounding condemnation seemingly reserved only for consensual sexual
relationships.
19. See Peter J. Markie, Professors, Students, and Friendship, in Moalirr, RasrONSlBIL-
iTY, AND THE UNIVERSITY: STUDIES IN ACADEMIC ETHics 134, 135 (Steven M. Cahn
ed., 1990).
20. Randall Kennedy, My Race Problem-And Ours, THE ATLANc MONTHLY, May
1997, at 55.
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II. THE MISSING LINKS BETWEEN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AND LAWFUL CONSENSUAL SEXUAL RELATIONS
Jane Gallop, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at
the University of Wisconsin, was charged with sexual harassment.21
While she was partially cleared of the allegation by the affirmative ac-
tion office, Professor Gallop was found to have violated the
university's policy on "consensual amorous relations," included within
the university ban on sexual harassment.' Professor Gallop was not
romantically involved with the student complainant, but did have a
close working relationship that eventually became strained following
Professor Gallop's criticism of the student's performance.23 The uni-
versity found that the intense personal relationship, which later
escalated into a volatile encounter, amounted to a consensual amorous
relationship in violation of the sexual harassment policy.24 In a similar
situation, a male university professor was suspended for one year
without pay for violating a ban on consensual relations, although the
student did not file a complaint.25
Clearly, something is remiss when someone is punished for vio-
lating a ban on "consensual amorous relations" absent a sexual
relationship or suspended for having a consensual relationship absent
a complaint of wrongdoing. The typical response to these two inci-
dents is one of disbelief that a university would overreact and censure
two professors under such circumstances.
Sexual harassment in an educational institution involving a
teacher and student is prohibited by Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.26 Some principles applicable to the workplace
under Title VII are relevant to Title IX cases. For example, sexual har-
assment of a student by a school employee is a form of gender
discrimination in the following circumstances:
1. Quid Pro Quo Harassment-A school employee explic-
itly or implicitly conditions a student's participation in
an education program or school activity or bases an
21. See Jane Gallop, Sex and Sexism: Feminism and Harassment Policy, ACADEME, Sept.-
Oct. 1994, at 16, 16.
22. See Gallop, supra note 21, at 16.
23. See Gallop, supra note 21, at 18.
24. See Gallop, supra note 21, at 16, 18.
25. See Gallop, supra note 21, at 22.
26. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1994).
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educational decision on the student's submission to un-
welcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. Quid
pro quo harassment is equally unlawful whether the stu-
dent resists and suffers the threatened harm or submits
and thus avoids the threatened harm.
2. Hostile Environment Harassment-Sexually harassing
conduct by an employee (that can include unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature) [that] is
sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a stu-
dent's ability to participate in or benefit from an
education program or activity, or to create a hostile or
abusive educational environment.27
The Department of Education (DOE), Office of Civil Rights,
provides guidance to educational institutions on sexual harassment
under Title IX In its March 1997, publication, entitled Sexual Har-
assment, the DOE concludes that sexual conduct must be unwelcome
in order to constitute sexual harassment. 28 Thus, welcome sexual con-
duct, implicit in consensual relationships, is lawful-rendering it
unlawful for a state to ban consensual relationships as a proper means
of curbing gender discrimination. Furthermore, the DOE regulations
do not establish a prohibition on consensual sexual relations between
students and employees at post-secondary institutions.2 9 The proper
and exclusive focus is on sexual harassment as a component of gender
discrimination, under Title VII or Title IX. The law does not pro-
scribe the sexuality of either men or women because not all
27. Office for Civil Rights Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by
School Employees, 61 Fed. Reg. 52172 (1996) (citations omitted) (emphasis on un-
welcome added). See also Merntor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986)
("The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances
were 'unwelcome.'").
28. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other
Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12040 (1997). But see supra at 12040 n.41
(stating concerning consensual relationships: "Of course, nothing in Title IX would
prohibit a school from implementing policies prohibiting sexual conduct or sexual
relationships between students and adult employees."). The author believes this
statement is incorrect. Protectionist legislation violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection clause and thus Tide IX.
29. See Verna Williams & Deborah L. Blake, Sexual Harassment: Let the Punishment Fit
the Crime, THE CHRONIcLE oF HIGHER EDUCATION, April 18, 1997, at A56.
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communications of a sexual nature are unwelcome, discriminatory, or
sexist in content or meaning. Nevertheless, despite reason and con-
trolling law, CRP advocates persist in their belief that sexuality is, per
se, harmful to the academy and a proper subject for sanction. This is
simply sex phobia.
CRP proponents and academic administrators, acting as spokes-
persons for chancellors, regents, and trustees, joined to bridge the
otherwise impossible gap between the statutory definitions of sexual
harassment and the CRP. To this end, they define consensual sexual
relations between students and faculty with language that mimics sex-
ual harassment law and expand the scope of prohibited sexual conduct
itself. Peter DeChiara notes that, "[i]n deciding whether to enter a
sexual relationship with a teacher, a student may take into account the
teacher's power."30 He continues by saying that "the student may see
the teacher's power as a direct threat, and that threat may strongly in-
fluence her decision . .. the student may feel pressured
Similarly, Nancy ("Ann") Davis, in her article Sexual Harassment in
the University, articulates concerns regarding the authenticity of a stu-
dent's consent to sexual relationships with a professor.32 Davis
encourages universities to move beyond legal definitions of sexual har-
assment to include a whole range of activity loosely referred to as
"sexually inappropriate behavior."3 3 The university, according to
Davis, should spend its energies on "formulating policies that empha-
size education and sensitization of the faculty [rather] than on the
more legalistic enterprise of defining sexual harassment." 4
The AAUP incorporated the arguments of these academics by in-
cluding the following language in their policy statement on consensual
relationships: "[T]he power exercised by the professor in an academic
or evaluative role, makes voluntary consent by the student suspect.,
3
1
This clause reflects the "power differential" theory rooted in radical
feminist discourse and the writings of Catharine A. MacKinnon, who
questions "whether, under conditions of male supremacy, the notion
30. DeChiara, supra note 13, at 141 (emphasis added).
31. DeChiara, supra note 13, at 141-42 (emphasis added).
32. Nancy ("Ann") Davis, Sexual Harassment in the University, in MoRAIry, RESPONSI-
BILiTY, AND THE UNvERsiY, supra note 19, at 150, 155.
33. Davis, supra note 32, at 166.
34. Davis, supra note 32, at 166. This is exactly what the National Association of Schol-
ars has condemned as an assault on the dignity of individuals who hold "incorrect
views." See NATIONAL AssocIATION OF SCHOLARS, supra note 5.
35. Consenual Relations, supra note 8, at 64.
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of consent has any real meaning for women.",6 This, however, denies
women the right to consent. As Professor Gallop correctly observes,
the "[p]rohibition of consensual relations is based in the assumption
that when a woman says yes she really means no. I cannot help but
think that this proceeds from the same logic in which when a woman
says no she really means yes. The first assumption is protectionist; the
second reflects the logic of harassment."
3 7
Under the guise of professional standards, high ideals, fairness,
and concern for less powerful individuals in the academy, the focus
has shifted from gender-based discrimination to sex itself. Nadine
Strossen, President of the ACLU and Professor of Law at New York
University Law School, has characterized sexual harassment law as a
c"Trojan horse for smuggling [radical feminist] views on sexual expres-
sion into our law and culture."38 Strossen notes that a "distorted
concept of sexual harassment" has arisen from the "false equation of
... sexual expression and sexual harassment," a falsehood that has
been "widely accepted by employers, employees, campus officials, stu-
dents, and policy makers, too often without serious examination." 9
Academic administrators have joined with the AAUP and femi-
nist ideologues in an attempt to bridge the rather large gap between
proscribed conduct, i.e., gender discrimination, and lawful consensual
sexual relationships. For example, the AAUP has aided university and
college administrators in their quest to monitor consensual sexual re-
lationships by arguing that the CRP is desired and endorsed by the
teaching profession. Furthermore, building on the works of feminist
scholars, CRP supporters rest their arguments on the notion of a
"power differential," 0 thereby camouflaging proposals banning con-
sensual relationships in protectionist language linked to sexual
harassment.
The AAUP policy on consensual relationships constitutes an im-
proper attempt to impose an affirmative professional duty for an
illegitimate purpose. First, no objective empirical data has been cited
36. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEx DISCRIMINATION 298 n.8 (1979).
37. Gallop, supra note 21, at 22. For another critique of the radical feminist view on
consensual relationships, see New Rules About Sex on Campus, HARPERS MAGAZINE,
Sept. 1993, at 33-42.
38. NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT
FORWOMEN'S RIGHTS 119 (1995).
39. STROSSEN, supra note 38, at 119-20.
40. See Consensual Relations, supra note 8, at 64.
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to justify the ban. Rather, the rationale underlying the policy is based
on stereotypical notions about men and helpless women needing pro-
tection. Second, the ostensible concern with sexual harassment
conceals the ulterior motive of avoiding financial liability in the event
of a lawsuit. Agency principles dictate that educational institutions,
like private employers, are responsible for the sexual harassment of
their employees.41 Finally, neutral principles, even-handed enforce-
ment, and logic dictate that both parties be prevented from creating
the risk of injury; the risk-creating conduct imposes a potential pen-
alty on only one of the two participants-usually the male professor.
Typically the female student, presumed to be at great risk for exploi-
tation and harm, is exempt from sanctions.
Institutional administrators have seized the moment to imple-
ment this newly minted affirmative professional duty to serve their
own ends. The ban imposes an affirmative duty on professors to re-
frain from lawful conduct and curtail intimate associations in order to
insulate, not themselves, but institutions from any possible legal ac-
tion. Professors breaching this duty and failing to notify the
institution of consensual relationships face disciplinary action for sex-
ual harassment even though no harassment has occurred. The danger
is that colleges and universities may at some future time elect to im-
pose a duty to restrict other associations deemed detrimental; speech,
writing, and research could all be limited to protect the institution. A
duty that limits lawful conduct is an unacceptable infringement on
personal liberty, not to mention the academic freedom that organiza-
tions such as the AAUP exist to protect.
The "power differential" thesis is important to academic admin-
istrators for other reasons. State colleges and universities are
administrative agencies of the state and can only make rules when the
constitution or statute gives them the authority to do so. Ostensibly
acting under the statutory authority of Title IX and the educational
amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "consensual relationship
bias" constitutes an administrative attempt to fill in the outline of the
41. Recently, the Supreme Court has severely limited the liability of school districts un-
der Tide IX. In Gebser v. Lago Vruta Independent School District, 118 S. Ct. 1989,
1999 (1998), the Court said damages may not be recovered unless an official of the
school district, with the authority at least to institute corrective measures on the dis-
trict's behalf, has actual notice of and is deliberately indifferent to the teacher's
misconduct. The lack of a sexual harassment policy or grievance procedure alone does
not establish deliberate indifference. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2000.
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statute by linking professor-student relationships to gender discrimi-
nation through the "power differential" thesis. Like all administrative
regulations, it can be challenged on the ground that it is inconsistent
with the statute.12
Statutes are construed narrowly by the courts, 3 and Title IX does
not include a proscription on consensual sexual relations. Still, the
"doctrine of analogy" is often used by courts to include within the
purview of a statute that which is very similar but not specifically
mentioned.4 The question then is whether consensual sexual relations
are so much like gender discrimination as to fall within the statute and
are similarly punishable.
Sexual harassment may be defined legally to include criminal acts
ranging from lewdness to sexual assault and rape.45 Indeed, Dr. John
Gottman, a psychologist at the University of Washington, has said
that "[s]exual harassment is a subtle rape, and rape is more about fear
than sex."16 Likewise, Dr. Louise Fitzgerald of the University of Illi-
nois believes that nearly 70 percent of all sexual harassments involve
assertions of power.4 7 The Supreme Court has been even more ex-
plicit. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,"' Justice O'Connor held that
harassment, to be actionable under Title VII, requires an objectively
hostile or abusive environment and a subjective perception of a hostile
or abusive environment." Title VII, and by extension Tide IX, pro-
hibits discrimination with respect to employment and covers "the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in em-
ployment." 0 Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion, said that a
determination of whether sexual discrimination has occurred is based
on "whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms
or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are
not exposed." 5 Both the Civil Rights Division of the DOE and courts
42. See LAWRENCE BAum, AmERicAN COURTS: PROCESS AND Poucy 3 (3d ed. 1994).
43. See HAROLD J. BERmAN ET AL., THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAw 116 (5th ed.
1996).
44. See BERmAN, supra note 43, at 116-20.
45. See BFRmAN, supra note 43, at 802.
46. Daniel Goleman, Sexual Harassment: It's About Power, Not Lust, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 1991, at C1.
47. See Goleman, supra note 46, at C1, C12.
48. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
49. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
50. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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have made clear that Title VII and Title IX prohibit discrimination in
employment and education. Lawful, nonproscribed consensual sexual
relations do not fall under this ban, because they do not constitute
discrimination.
III. MULLER V. OREGON REVISITED: A PROBLEM
OF EQUAL PROTECTION
In 1903 Oregon passed a law limiting the employment of women
in factories and laundries to ten hours a day.52 Curt Muller, a laundry
owner, was convicted of violating the statute by keeping a woman at
work for longer than ten hours.53 Muller appealed to the Supreme
Court, arguing that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates equal treatment of men and women, and the
legislature could not, under the guise of its police power, deprive
women of their liberty and property.54 In January 1908, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the Oregon law.5 Speaking for the
Court, Justice Brewer said, "the physical well-being of woman be-
comes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the
strength and vigor of the race."' 6 Thus began a new era as protective
legislation for women swept the country.
The CRP attempts to return to the sexual mores of the nine-
teenth century, when patriarchal and sexist assumptions permeated
American society. CRP enthusiasts, with a neo-Victorian view of sex,
have simply reinvigorated sexism under a banner of protectionism.
Perhaps more disturbing is the vast power that advocates of the CRP
would give to administrative agencies. Today, the famous "Brandeis
Brief," filed by Louis D. Brafideis in support of the Oregon law, is
seen as a flawed document containing data derived from sloppy pro-
cedures and a methodology lacking adequate controls or testing for
independent variables.5 7 The Brandeis brief was laced with "common
knowledge" and notions that women were weak and vulnerable, the
52. See Muflerv. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416 (1908).
53. Muller, 208 U.S. at 417.
54. Muller, 208 U.S. at 417.
55. Muller, 208 U.S. at 423.
56. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
57. See NANcY WOLOCH, MULLER V. OREGON: A Bimu HISTORY Wim DocuMairrrs
31-33 (1996).
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very same assumptions relied on by the AAUP in their attempts to
protect women from consensual sexual relationships.
Brandeis appealed to the Court to sustain the Oregon law as a
valid exercise of the state's police power to legislate for the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens.58 The Court upheld Brandeis's view,
rejecting Muller's substantive rights claim that the Oregon law vio-
lated freedom of contract-a liberty and property right protected by
the United States Constitution from the state's police power." In re-
jecting Muller's argument, the Court stressed that women, unlike
men, were a special class who needed protection from the greed and
passion of men.60 Justice Brewer placed considerable emphasis on the
public welfare in protecting potential mothers and bearers of the race
who, by nature, were dependent persons."
The Brewer protectionist rationale is stretched well beyond the
snapping point when state universities and colleges invoke the police
power of the state to regulate sexual partners for the public welfare.
Academic administrators who endorse, support, and enforce the ban
on consensual relationships make women and their sexual activity the
special concern of the state. In fact, it is difficult to envision any limits
on the state's police power should the CRP prevail. The concomitant
and more devastating threat to the public welfare is the tyranny flow-
ing from administrative agencies exercising unchecked power, not
consensual sex between a student and a professor. Given the dearth of
objective evidence proffered to support the ban, opinion has been
construed as fact and CRP supporters have sought government inter-
vention to regulate consensual sexual behavior when no societal
interest is at stake.
Gender specific legislation that treats women as a separate class,
as in the Muller case, necessarily emphasizes differences rather than
similarities and inequities rather than equality. For example, protec-
tive laws often implicitly define women as weak and dependent, like
children. Not until the 1960s did gender equality become law-as
embodied in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Afterward,
protective laws that treated women differently than men fell before the
58. SeeMuller, 208 U.S. at419 n.1.
59. SeeMuller, 208 U.S. at 421,422.
60. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421-22.
61. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421-22.
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banner of equality.62 UAWv. Johnson Controls, Inc.,63 dealt with com-
pany policies designed to protect employees exposed to concentrates
of lead during manufacturing processes.6 To protect the health of
pregnant employees and women of childbearing years, the company
adopted a fetal protection policy barring all women from jobs involv-
ing lead exposure, absent medical documentation of infertility.65 The
company conceded that its fetal protection policy was prompted in
part by fears of possible lawsuits. 66 The Court unanimously rejected
the company's argument, finding that the exclusionary plan consti-
tuted a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. 67
Whether gender distinctions are based on state statutes, or gov-
ernment regulations, the Supreme Court applies an intermediate-level
scrutiny test to gender classification under the Fourteenth Amend-6186
ment. In Craig v. Boren, 9  the Supreme Court ruled that
"classifications by gender must serve important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." 70
The substantial burden imposed by the Court to sustain gender
classifications forces CRP supporters to argue alternate positions.
First, CRP proponents may argue that the proscriptions are gender
neutral, applying to both men and women in the academy. However,
this would be an embarrassingly disingenuous position for an institu-
tion and profession that prides itself on searching for truth.
This gender-neutral argument resembles that made by the State
of Virginia to sustain its anti-miscegenation law. Virginia contended
that its law banning interracial marriages did not violate either the
equal protection or due process clauses of the Fourteenth
62. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Weeks v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific
Company, 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968). In 1969, the EEOC proclaimed
that occupational exdusions designed to protect women were discriminatory. See 29
C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(i) & (iii) (1998).
63. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
64. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 191.
65. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 192.
66. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 210.
67. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 211.
68. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, noted that distinctions based on "romantic paternalism" put women in a
cage. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684.
69. Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
70. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added).
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Amendment, because the statute equally punished both the white and
black participants.7 ' Chief Justice Warren rejected the "equal
application" argument in race classification cases.72  Although
classifications based on race are inherently suspect and subject to strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, whereas gender classifications require only intermediate
scrutiny,7 the positions of Virginia and the AAUP are analogous and
similarly faulty.
In 1973, the Supreme Court demanded that all classifications
further some legitimate, articulated, nonillusory state purpose.74 For
gender classifications the state purpose must be substantially related to
an important government objective.75 Moreover, the "test for deter-
mining the validity of a gender-based classification ... must be
applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the
statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions."
7
1
The purpose of protecting female students, while it may be important,
is not valid because it is based on these "stereotypical notions."
Further, the CRP cannot be rescued simply by maintaining that
it is a benign sex classification that aids women in furthering their
education unencumbered by a sexual environment. The Court applies
exactly the same standard to benign aid to women as it does to disad-
vantaging classifications.7 Considerable proof of the intent of the
policy is required through actual and articulated legislative purposes,
and the Court will carefully scrutinize the statutory scheme itself and
the legislative history.8 Justice Brennan articulated the problem inher-
ent in benign gender classification in Orr v. Orn.71 "Legislative
71. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3, 7-8 (1967).
72. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
73. Compare City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), with Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17
(1993) and Craig, 429 U.S. 190. Indeed, even under the courts equal protection ju-
risdiction, which requires an exceedingly persuasive justification for a gender-based
classification, it remains an open question whether classifications based on gender are
inherently suspect.
74. See, e.g., McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973).
75. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-98.
76. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982).
77. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 279 (1979).
78. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 639 (1975).
79. Orr, 440 U.S. 268.
[Vol. 6:47
1999] CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE CONSTITUTION 63
classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of
gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the
'proper place' of women and their need for special protection. Even
statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and ameliorate the
effects of past discrimination must be carefully tailored.""0
Since the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963," women's or-
ganizations active in the legislative process have emphasized
constitutional equality (Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 
1974,82
Women's Educational Equity Act of 1988,83 Equal Rights Amend-
ment,84 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 198885). The CRP is a large
step backward from an equalizing standard, once again making
women and their sexual activity the special concern of the govern-
ment. It is ironic that policies designed to protect women are being
smuggled through the back door and into regulations that deny gen-
der equality and concomitantly limit and degrade the freedom of
women.
IV. THE CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIP POLICY VERSUS
A LIBERTYSuBsTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIM
The most distressing aspect of the position advanced by the
AAUP and academic administrators is their failure to acknowledge the
constitutional philosophy underlying privacy interests. Personal
autonomy, 'the basis of constitutional privacy, supports individuals'
right to control information about themselves and to prevent intru-
sion into their lives.86 Privacy is at the core of our value system. For
example, personal choices concerning religion and political prefer-
ences are two legally recognized privacy interests formally protected
from government intrusion by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution.
80. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 at 283.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994).
83. 20 U.S.C. § 3041 (1994).
84. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994).
86. See WILLIAM COHEN & JOHN KAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CIVIL LIBERTY AND
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTs 515 (1992). For a good general treatment of the vanishing right
of privacy, see THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRrTY, NOTHING SACRED: THE Pou-
TICS OF PRIVACY (1998).
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Private conduct is not an absolute right. However, there are both
legal and natural limits. Legal limitations in the name of public inter-
est and well-being are confined to conduct that is morally wrong--
conduct lawmakers believe would cause deep revulsion in ordinary
people.8' However, the politically powerful elite members of society
have on occasion adopted laws restricting the behavior of many, while
only reflecting the morality of a few.88 The AAUP-supported ban on
consensual relationships is an example of such a situation-the expres-
sion of the morality of a few who wish to regulate personal conduct
within the academy.
Contemporary America risks undervaluing privacy rights. Con-
sider the following excerpt from a standard consensual relationship
policy statement now being considered by many colleges and univer-
sities:
In a consensual relationship, the individual in direct pro-
fessional power or authority over the other person, is
encouraged to consult with the department chair, appropri-
ate Vice President, or the Office of Affirmative Action.
Reassignment of duties and responsibilities can serve to
eliminate the power or authority of one individual over the
other.
If the consensual relationship between a faculty member
and student or a supervisor and supervisee is not reported
and effective steps are not taken to ensure unbiased evalua-
tions or supervision, sanctions the same as those possible for
a violation of the sexual harassment policy may be insti-
tuted.8"
What is significant about this proposal, within the context of a
privacy claim, is not only the requirement that the faculty member
report the relationship under pain of sanctions, but the forced disclo-
sure of the personal life of another, regardless of his or her consent to
87. See DAVID A. J. RicHARDs, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 238 (1986). For a
limited, but excellent treatment of privacy interests, see ELLEN ALDERMAN & CARO-
LUNE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY (1995).
88. See COHEN & KPI.AN, supra note 86, at 526-27.
89. FACULTY WELFARE COMM., COMMUNITY COLLEGE OF SOUTHERN NEVADA (April
1996).
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the disclosure. Instead of political suppression, this represents an un-
regulated state of "sexpression." 90
The similarity between McCarthyism, consuming university
campuses in the late 1940s, and the current consensual relationship
phenomenon is disconcerting. During the McCarthy era, the academy
collaborated in curtailing political freedom by excluding members for
their associations, personal and organizational. Throughout the pe-
riod, academic administrators, faculty, trustees, regents, and
government officials set political tests for academic fitness and put in
motion a system for monitoring the activities of nonconformists. 91
The most common tactic for weeding out communists used by
congressional committees, state agencies, the FBI, academic adminis-
trators, and faculty committees involved summoning suspect
professors and inquiring into their political choices. If the suspect
convinced interrogators that the taint of the Communist Party was
simply a past flirtation, there remained the issue of student corruption
and the required disclosure of names of people involved with commu-
nism. Refusal to identify others with whom the suspect had a
relationship immediately provoked a threat of a public hearing, thus
discrediting the professor's reputation in the public eye. Most often,
naming others got the professor off the hook, while those who refused
to name "known communists" faced disciplinary action for "conduct
unbecoming a member of the academy."92 The unbecoming conduct
involved the reputation and prestige of the institution, which the
professor was guilty of allowing to fall into disrepute.
The process of repression in the McCarthy years mandated pro-
fessional exclusion, even if no law was broken. The era demonstrated
that "suppression is more effective as an agency of freedom than is
freedom itself."93 Today, the prospect of a university requiring disclo-
sure of a professor's political philosophy would be considered
intrusive, a threat to First Amendment rights, and is a requirement
consistently opposed by the AAUP. Now, however, the political winds
have shifted; the AAUP supports the right, indeed the need, for em-
ployers to demand that employees reveal their private sexual relations.
Just as students might have been corrupted by dangerous political
90. STRossEN, supra note 38, 83-106.
91. See generally ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, No IvoRy TowE,: McCARTMSM AND THE
UNrvEss (1986).
92. SCHRECKER, supra note 91, at 96, 97, 100-103.
93. SCHRCKR, supra note 91, at 110.
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views in the 1950s, the AAUP argues that students are now in a simi-
lar danger, corrupted by the influence of sex. Once repression was
justified in the name of political orthodoxy, now it is justified in the
name of sexual orthodoxy.
It is not surprising that the AAUP and faculty colleagues are
complicit in this "sexual McCarthyism."9 During the 1950s, faculty
neither organized nor protested against the disciplinary actions rang-
ing from suspensions to dismissals. They did not challenge the
blacklisting of colleagues, instead resolving "to study the problem.""
Ultimately, the AAUP did not censure any school or publish a report
on the widespread abuses until the crisis passed. This unfortunate
performance is being repeated today for many of the same reasons.
The AAUP does not consider privacy and autonomy as issues deserv-
ing the same protection as speech, publication, or research. Their
selective protection of liberty interests creates a precedent for more
intrusion by the government.
Similar to the atmosphere of repression generated by the
McCarthy inquiries, refusal to cooperate today means the possible
imposition of sanctions for failing to perform an academic duty. The
AAUP believes that faculty have a duty to disclose personal facts of
legitimate concern to the institution. That is, professors are obligated
to protect the institution from harm, when, in fact, the AAUP, tenure,
and academic freedom are supposed to assure the opposite: that the
professor is protected from the institution. The AAUP argues that the
rights of some must be sacrificed for the larger goal of the whole.
CRP opponents must show the existence of a right abridged by
government action. Unlike the McCarthy era, when it took years to
decide cases of first impression involving significant First Amendment
rights,96 CRP opponents have a century of constitutional law defining
94. The term "sexual McCarthyism" has been used by many others and the author makes
no claim on its originality.
95. ScHREcxER, supra note 91, at 312.
96. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (5-4 decision holding that
First Amendment rights could be overridden by Congress to insure the self-
preservation of society). Significantly, in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963), the Court in another 5-4 ruling restricted the
power of state legislative investigations. Florida began investigating the link between
the N.A.A.C.P. and the Communist Party. Restating previous rulings on associational
rights, the Court held that "[flree speech and free association are fundamental and
highly prized, and need breathing space to survive." Id. at 542. Addressing the power
of the state to intrude into the area of fundamental rights, Goldberg said the state
may investigate "in order.., to protect its legitimate and vital interest." Gibson, 372
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privacy rights. As early as 1888, Judge Thomas Cooley, in his treatise
on the law of torts, took notice of the right to be "let alone." 97 Two
years later, Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, then private attor-
neys, published The Right to Privacy.98 However, it was not until 1928
that Brandeis had an opportunity to expound on his views in a judi-
cial forum. In Olmstead v. United States,99 the Supreme Court held
that the Fourth Amendment did not require search warrants for police
interception of telephone conversations because things, not conversa-
tions, were protected.'m Dissenting, Justice Brandeis said:
The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth]
Amendments is much broader in scope. The makers of our
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and satis-
faction of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men.'°1
While the Supreme Court has been reluctant to declare a general
constitutional right of privacy and has instead proceeded on a case-by-case
U.S. at 542. The state must show "a substantial relation between the information
sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest." Gibson, 372 U.S. at
542. In Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960), noted in Gibson, 372 U.S. at
544, the Court said, "Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal lib-
erty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is
compelling."
97. See 2 DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLrrCs: CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES 1168 (1995).
98. Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193
(1890). By 1960, thirty-one states had recognized privacy rights. See O'BRIEN, supra
note 97, at 1169.
99. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
100. Olmstead, 277 U.S.
101. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478. Brandeis's conception of Fourth Amendment protections
was later adopted by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967). Katz overruled Olmstead. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
basis, its decisions clearly evince a trend toward less government intru-
sion into areas of personal choice.
The link between the Fourteenth Amendment and privacy inter-
ests properly begins with Griswold v. Connecticut.10 2 Griswold was the
executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut.
Planned Parenthood gave advice to married couples on contraception,
in violation of the state's anti-contraception law, and Griswold was
found guilty as an accessory to the illegal use of contraceptives. The
Court concluded that privacy is a substantive right protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."3 Indeed, Justice
Douglas elucidated privacy rights in the penumbras of the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, applicable to the states
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 ' In another case, Justice
Douglas said that there is a "zone of privacy" contained within the
meaning of the First and Fifth Amendments such that the government
may not force disclosure or surrender to the detriment of the individ-
ual.
10 5
Justice Goldberg stated in his concurring opinion that the con-
cept of liberty protects fundamental personal rights and is not
confined to those rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.' Linking
liberty and due process, he declared that the latter protects those lib-
erties "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
rank as fundamental."0 7
Griswold recognized that private marital decisions are a
fundamental, constitutionally protected right. Likewise, consensual
relationships prior to marriage logically enjoy similar protection,
102. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In an earlier case, Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court struck down the state's Habitual Criminal
Sterilization Act mandating compulsory sterilization after a third felony conviction
for a "crime of moral turpitude." Justice Douglas, delivering the opinion of the
Court, looked to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to pro-
tect fundamental interests, using substantive due process to protect basic liberties not
linked to a specific constitutional guarantee.
103. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
104. See Griswold 381 U.S. at 485.
105. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also Gibson v. Florida Legisla-
tive Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (refining the associational right first
articulated in the NA. C.P. case); see generally Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
633-34 (1886) (providing additional discussion of this issue).
106. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-87.
107. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
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otherwise the marriage protection would be a hollow right. In
Griswold, Connecticut argued that its anti-contraceptive law would
help curb incidents of extra-marital relations.0 8 The Court rejected
this argument as lacking a compelling state interest.'0 9 Likewise, in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court struck down a Massachusetts law
prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons,"0 and
in Carey v. Population Services International, the Court upheld the
distribution of contraceptives to persons under the age of sixteen."' In
Eisenstadt, Justice Brennan extended the Griswold ruling beyond the
narrow confines of marriage:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question in-
hered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own,
but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the deci-
sion whether to bear or beget a child."'
The Supreme Court has consistently sought to keep the government
out of individuals' sex lives, with the exception of limited areas, such
as the age and capacity to consent.
The personal autonomy protected by the Constitution is funda-
mental to the individual pursuit of happiness. The CRP allows
academic administrators to coerce information from employees about
their private lives, effectively denying their constitutional right to be
let alone. The AAUP has placed undue reliance on procedural due
process guarantees, rather than upon substantive rights guaranteed by
the Constitution."13 Their insistence upon adequate safeguards misses
the point; consensual sexual behavior of citizens is not the business of
any governing body.
108. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
109. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
110. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
111. Careyv. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
112. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
113. See Suggested Policy, supra note 6, at 62, 63 n.5.
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V. THE CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIP POLICY VERSUS AUTONOMY AS
A RIGHT GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION
Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment reads, "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." 114 Professor Laurence H. Tribe has persuasively argued
that the due process clause insulates aspects of individual behavior
from government intrusion,"' prohibiting state governments from
enacting legislation beyond their sphere of authority. In fact, the Su-
preme Court has never enumerated an exclusive list of the substantive
rights protected by the due process clause, because to do so would give
state governments nearly unlimited control to intrude into the lives of
its citizens. And as Professor Tribe notes, "[t]he threat of government
regulation of these kinds of intimate personal choices cannot lightly
be dismissed."" 6 The state must show a compelling reason to proscribe
conduct that infringes on personal privacy because "a person belongs
to himself and not others nor to society as a whole."" 7 This obstacle to
state action under the Fourteenth Amendment is to protect the indi-
vidual from both the excesses of the majority and a politically
energized minority. Persons cannot be forced to relinquish their pri-
vacy rights to become instrumentalities of the state.
Included in the right of privacy is personal autonomy: the free-
dom to make certain decisions free from regulation. This is the heart
of Roe v. Wade,"' and the antithesis of the AAUP which adopted the
philosophical position advanced by the State of Texas to support its
anti-abortion law in Roe. Texas argued that a compelling state interest
justified a prohibition of abortions, and the AAUP believes a compel-
ling state interest justifies prohibiting consensual relationships.
However, a woman's right to choose abortion is no different from her
ability to choose a sexual partner. Therefore, according to Roe, neither
interest rises to the level of "compelling" to justify proscription.
In Roe, Justice Blackmun began his constitutional analysis of the
issue by stressing the appellant's reliance on Griswold."9 Blackmun
reaffirmed the traditional right of personal privacy, or a "zone of pri-
114. U.S. Consr., amend. XIV, § 1.
115. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 77-112 (1990).
116. TRIBE, supra note 115, at 95.
117. TRIBE, supra note 115, at 102.
118. Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
119. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129, 152 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
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vacy," invaded by the state through its newly created abortion 
law.' 20
Interestingly, the American Association of University Women sub-
mitted an amicus curiae brief supporting women's absolute right to
choose whether to terminate a pregnancy and arguing the lack of a
legitimate state interest. The majority in Roe acknowledged that pri-
vacy must be balanced against legitimate state interests, finding that
limits on fundamental rights can be justified only by a compelling
state interest advanced through narrowly tailored legislation.'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart wrote that the liberty
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
covers more than the freedoms explicitly named in the Bill of
Rights.' 22 Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, did not disagree with the
proposition that liberty embraces more than the rights expressed in
the Bill of Rights.3 However, unlike the majority, Rehnquist would
eschew the compelling state interest test, preferring a rationality stan-
dard-whereby the state need only show that the regulation bears a
"rational relation to a valid state objective."' 24 This rationality stan-
dard, applied to economic and social legislation, is the same position
as that advanced by the AAUP.
DeChiara's article limits liberty and privacy interests in order to
support the CRP and states that the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment applies to state, not private, actors. The cases cited
by DeChiara do not support state proscription of consensual relation-
ships. For example, one case involved the romance between a graduate
student and an undergraduate; another involved sexual harassment,
not consensual sexual relations; and a third concerned secondary in-
stitutions rather than colleges and universities. 125 DeChiara concludes
that:
120. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-54.
121. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
122. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 168-170 (Stewart, J., concurring). It is important to note that
Stewart was in the minority in Griswold. By the time of Roe, he realized that the line
of cases since Griswold involved the unconstitutionality of invading a person's liberty,
not a pure right of privacy. See JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE EVOLVING CoNSTITU-
TION: How Trsm SUPREME COURT Has RULED ON IssuEs FROM ABORTION TO
ZONING 18 (1992).
123. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 172-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
124. Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
125. See DeChiara, supra note 13, at 149-154.
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Since faculty-student relationships are probably not shielded
by the right to privacy, intervention by universities is proba-
bly constitutional. For intervention to pass a test of
constitutionality, a university would need only show that the
intervention is a rational means of achieving legitimate ends.
Since protecting students from coercion and favoritism are le-
gitimate ends, and intervening in a faculty-student
relationship is an arguably rational means of achieving these
ends, the university actions would probably pass this low
level of constitutional scrutiny with ease.1
26
In accord with DeChiara, the AAUP has adopted a rational rela-
tion standard for resolving due process clause issues, contradicting the
line of cases beginning with Griswold and extending through Roe. The
rational relation standard, reserved since 1938 for the resolution of
economic substantive due process issues, is now advanced to support a
ban on consensual relationships that is both irrational and protection-
ist.
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided Whalen v. Roe,'27 a mile-
stone for privacy rights. In Whalen the Court upheld a New York
State statute requiring the computer storage of prescriptions for lawful
drugs. Although opponents of the statute contended that disclosure
violated privacy rights and could deter patients from seeking medical
treatment, the Court determined that the state provided adequate
safeguards for the stored information.'28 Speaking for the Court, Jus-
tice Stevens recognized that certain personal information is important
and constitutionally protected. Justice Stevens noted that the cases
protecting privacy "have in fact involved at least two different kinds of
interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters and another is the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions.'
29
Building on Whalen, several federal courts held that required dis-
closure of consensual sexual relationships is unconstitutional. In
Thorne v. El Segundo,'3" a female applicant for the police department
was forced to reveal that she had an affair with a married police offi-
126. DeChiara, supra note 13, at 152 (emphasis added).
127. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
128. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600-01.
129. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591.
130. Thorne v. El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983).
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cer. As a result, Ms. Thorne was removed from the department's eligi-
bility list, prompting her to sue the city for invasion of her
constitutional rights to privacy and free association. The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that,
[t]he Constitution protects two kinds of privacy interests.
"One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters, and another is the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions."... [The] de-
fendants invaded her right to privacy by forcing her to
disclose information regarding personal sexual matters....
[They also] ... interfer[ed] with ... her freedom of associa-
don.
13 1
In Briggs v. North Muskegon Police Department,'3 2 a North Mus-
kegon police officer was fired when he informed the chief of police
that he separated from his wife and was living with another woman.
Briggs sued the city, contending that his right to privacy and associa-
tion was violated, as off-duty living arrangements bore no relationship
to job performance. The District Court agreed, finding that
"infringement of an important constitutionally protected right is [not]
justified simply because of general community disapproval of the
protected conduct. The very purpose of constitutional protection of
individual liberties is to prevent such majoritarian coercion.
" 13
State-imposed bans on consensual relationships also constitute
state interference with the fundamental right of marriage. In Zablocki
v. Redhail, 4 the Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin law man-
dating state permission for marriage licenses if the person had a child
from a previous marriage and was required to pay child support. Red-
hail's marriage license application was denied for nonpayment of child
support from a previous relationship, prompting Redhail to challenge
the statute under the equal protection and due process clauses.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Marshall applied a strict scrutiny
analysis because the right to marry is fundamental.' 35 Justice Marshall
found that it would be incongruous to recognize the right of privacy
131. Thorne, 726 F.2d at 468 (citation omitted).
132. Briggs v. North Muskegon Police Dep't., 563 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
133. Briggs, 563 F. Supp. at 590-91.
134. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
135. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383.
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in family life without similarly protecting the right to enter into a re-
lationship that gives rise to a family.3 6 Justice Marshall indicated that
the right to procreate "must imply some right to enter the only rela-
tionship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally
to take place."'37 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued for the tradi-
tional presumption of the validity of a state regulation as expressed in
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. 3'
The compelling state interest standard under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to those funda-
mental liberty interests traditionally valued by society.' 39 Family life,
the home, and incidents of marriage fall within the orbit of constitu-
tionally protected activity."' Similarly, consensual sexual relationships
among heterosexual adults is valued and protected by society, as re-
flected in the line of cases challenging state laws criminalizing
sodomy.
Sodomy statutes help clarify whether the Griswold-Roe precedents
extend to consensual sexual behavior. In Doe v. Commonwealth's At-
torney for Richmond,14 the Court upheld the dismissal of a challenge
to Virginia's sodomy law. A decade later, in Board of Education of
Oklahoma City v. National Gay Task Force,12 the Court struck a law
firing teachers who advocated homosexual relations. One year later, in
1986 the Court heard Bowers v. Hardwick,'43 in which Hardwick,
charged with violating Georgia's sodomy law, challenged the consti-
tutionality of the statute as violative of his due process rights. After
losing at the appellate level, Georgia appealed to the Supreme
Court. 1'4
Professor Tribe, representing Hardwick, argued that the statute
exceeded the government's power to criminalize the private sexual
conduct between consenting adults. Justice White, speaking for the
136. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
137. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
138. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
139. See supra Part IV.
140. See supra Part IV.
141. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affg 403 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
142. Board of Educ. of Okla. City v. National Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. 903 (1985), affg
per curiam, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984).
143. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
144. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 189.
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Court, avoided the broader implications of the case as suggested by
Professor Tribe and narrowed the question presented: "We express no
opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as applied to
other acts of sodomy.... Nor are we inclined to take a more expan-
sive view of our authority to discover new fundamental rights
imbedded in the Due Process Clause."145 In Justice White's words,
"[t]he issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy....
Relying on the country's historical opposition to homosexual sodomy,
the Court declined to recognize such a right.'47 Moreover, Chief Jus-
tice Burger, in his concurrence, stated that "[c]ondemnation of those




The four Justices in the minority insisted on adherence to the
holding in Griswold Privacy, or the right to be let alone, establishes
the right to make certain decisions independent of the state. 149 Justice
Blackmun maligned Georgia's argument that the statute was necessary
to protect public health, to slow the incidents of communicable dis-
eases, and to maintain a decent society; Georgia failed to offer
evidence to support these claims."0
CRP supporters have advanced reasons why the policy is needed,
even required. They have failed, however, to show a compelling state
interest to justify the liberty restrictions that inhere in the CRP. Fur-
thermore, some of the purported reasons are invalid, based on
inappropriate gender stereotypes. The CRP violates the right to pri-
vacy, by intruding into and prohibiting consensual sexual
relationships, associations which are fundamental according to post-
Roe decisions. Additionally, by forcing professors to disclose informa-
tion about these relations, the CRPs further invade their privacy.
145. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2, 194 (emphasis added).
146. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190.
147. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 189, 192-94.
148. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Powell was the swing
vote creating the five-person majority. Justice Powell, concerned with overturning the
statute because Hardwick had not been convicted, made clear that had Hardwick
been convicted, he might be protected by the Eighth Amendment to the Constim-
ion barring cruel and unusual punishments. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197-98; see
also O'BMaEN, supra note 97, at 1239-42.
149. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199-200.
150. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 208-213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Without a valid compelling state interest, CRP proponents have no
ground on which to stand.
CONCLUSION: THE BURDEN OF UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES
The ban on consensual relationships imposes an affirmative duty
on members of the academy to become instruments of the state, im-
posing the CRP proponents' moral and ethical vision in derogation of
fundamental liberties protected by the Constitution. The CRP placed
in the hands of those who have demonstrated an inclination to care
more about their own interests than advancing the pursuit of knowl-
edge is a dangerous weapon.
Professors Silva and Cohen 5' exemplify academy members vic-
-timized by an academy that fails to understand Title IX. Both were
charged with sexual harassment under ill-conceived and hastily-drawn
policies, and although neither discriminated nor made improper sex-
ual advances creating a hostile learning environment, they were
disciplined for their teaching styles. Their cases led to promulgation of
DOE guidelines including First Amendment protections in the defi-
nition of sexual harassment. While both the First Amendment and the
role of academic freedom in higher education protect Silva's and Co-
hen's conduct, their loss of reputation, financial burden, and
emotional strain are the result of poorly informed administrators' in-
tent on banning all things sexual.
Arguments supporting CRPs often center on the notion that con-
sent is questionable given the power differential between a student and
professor. There are several problems with this approach. First, a lack
of consent is not sexual harassment, but rape, a felony for which an
offender may be prosecuted and punished. CRP proponents' argu-
ments define a prima facie case for rape, a crime that should not be
pursued by human resource personnel or administrators untrained in
criminal investigation and prosecution.
Some colleges and universities pursue investigations using proce-
dures that attempt to guarantee due process. Because these
investigations verge on becoming criminal prosecutions, these over-
tures do not go far enough to protect normal constitutional
protections afforded criminal suspects such as the Fifth Amendment
151. See Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996); Silva v.
University of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994).
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privilege against self-incrimination. Professors targeted in an investi-
gation are further disadvantaged because of an assumed legitimacy of
an academic investigation, rendering failure to answer questions pro-
fessionally unacceptable. 1 2 The academy has simply changed the taint
of being a Fifth Amendment Communist to being a Fifth Amend-
ment rapist.
The academy has once again demonstrated a rather remarkable
ability to vigorously defend some freedoms while simultaneously
abandoning others. Unrecognized, however, is that the failure to de-
fend all protected freedom with equal vigor jeopardizes the liberty
interests of all. Academic freedom has little meaning without free
speech, research, and association, integral parts of higher education.
Rules proscribing interpersonal association erode fundamental privacy
and association rights and risk other relationships that may be deemed
threatening or harmful in the future. The CRP, like the attempts to
proscribe what is acceptable speech in the academy, is the slippery
slope leading to less, rather than more, freedom.
To support the CRP one must accept its core that women need
protection. Gender equality is compromised on the altar of protec-
tionism, consistently the argument of those who would curtail the role
of women in society. The long range implications of such a policy are
serious. Is a woman's right to choose a credible and viable concept in
the context of an abortion, but limited in the choice of a sexual part-
ner? Even if the government has a limited interest in the former, it has
no interest in the latter.
The AAUP has elected to embrace a policy selectively supporting
some liberty interests, while regrettably excluding the privacy interests
of professors and students. The sexual lives of consenting adults, ab-
sent a violation of law, are not the business of the academy. Lost
careers and damaged reputations have resulted from overzealous ad-
ministrations who seek to rid their institutions of sexual liaisons of
which they disapprove. The tyranny of administrative agencies con-
tinues unabated as it did in the 1940s and 1950s. This new repression
is simply McCarthyism in new clothing. But unlike the earlier period
when the AAUP did virtually nothing to protect the privacy rights of
professors, they now seek to actively support their invasion.
152. For example, Rutgers University fired a professor for invoking the Fifth Amendment
during the McCarthy years. See SCHRECKER, supra note 91, at 196.

